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Overview

Active Directory (AD) is the identity and access management backbone of most enterprise Windows environments. Compromising AD often means compromising the entire organization. This page follows the AD attack methodology from initial unauthenticated recon through full domain/forest compromise.
This content is for authorized penetration testing and red team operations only. AD attacks are highly impactful and should only be performed with explicit written authorization.

AD Structure Fundamentals

Active Directory organizes network resources into: AD Domain Services (AD DS) components:
  • Domain Services — centralized auth and directory
  • Certificate Services — PKI management
  • Federation Services — SSO across applications
  • Rights Management — DRM for content
  • DNS Service — name resolution for the domain

Phase 1: Unauthenticated Recon

1

Network Enumeration

2

SMB Null and Guest Enumeration

3

LDAP Anonymous Enumeration

4

User Enumeration

5

Network Poisoning (LLMNR/NBT-NS)

Gather NTLMv2 hashes by impersonating services with Responder:

Phase 2: Authenticated Enumeration

Once you have valid credentials or a session:

Kerberoasting

Request TGS tickets for service accounts and crack the RC4 encryption offline:

ASREPRoasting

Request AS-REP for accounts with DONT_REQ_PREAUTH set:

Hash Shucking (NT-Candidate Attacks)

Use an NT hash corpus to crack slower formats without knowing the plaintext:

Pass-the-Hash / Pass-the-Ticket

Delegation Attacks

Any computer with ADS_UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION attribute stores TGTs of all authenticating users in memory:
Requires WRITE privilege on target computer object:

Post-Exploitation with DA Privileges

DCSync — Domain Credential Dump

Golden Ticket

Forge TGTs using the krbtgt hash — valid for all domain accounts:

Silver Ticket

Forge TGS for a specific service using the service account’s hash:

Skeleton Key

Patch LSASS to allow any user to authenticate with a universal password:

DCShadow

Register a rogue Domain Controller to push attribute changes without AD audit logs:

Domain Trust Escalation

Enumerate Trust Relationships

SID History Injection (Child → Parent Escalation)

ACL-Based Persistence

After compromise, grant DCSync or other privileges for future access:

Password Spraying

Once you have a list of valid usernames, try common passwords — carefully respecting lockout policies:
Check the domain password policy before spraying to avoid account lockouts: Get-DomainPolicy or net accounts /domain

Hash Cracking Reference

After capturing hashes, crack them offline with hashcat:

References